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HighNoonon theWestern
Range.
A Property
RightsAnalysisofthe
JohnsonCountyWar
RANDYMCFERRINANDDOUGLASWILLS
basis of laterpopular
CountyWarof 1892 is thehistorical
Wyoming'sJohnson
of Wyothedevelopment
depictionsof theWest as violent,and it influenced
ming.Manysee thiseraas theendoftheopenrangesystemandtheascendancy
of stockranchingand farming.
Populardepictionarguesthattheeventwas an
firmsagainstsmallindividualsettlers.
of largeforeign-owned
act ofvigilantism
ofproperty
We arguethatthewarwas a conflict
rightssystemsanduse a model
developedbyAlston,Libecap,andMuellerto explainwhyviolencebrokeoutin
Johnson
Countyin 1892.
Found it and we
Richer(theRancher):Wemade thiscountry.
madeit... Made a saferangeoutofthis.Someus dieddoin' it.
We made it. Thenpeople movein who neverheld a rawhide
theold days.Fencedoffmyrange.Fencedmeofffrom
through
water.Some ofthemlikeyoupaw ditches,and takeout irrigaand I got to
tionwater,and so thecreekrunsdrysometimes,
movemystockbecauseof it.Andyou say we haveno rightsto
therange.
Stark(theHomesteader):You talkaboutrights.You think
you
gottherighttosay thatnobodyelse has gotany.Well,thatain't
looksat it.
thewaythegovernment
Shane[Paramount
Pictures,1953]

all
thespringof 1892,severalprominent
rangecattlebusinessmen,
In
membersof theWyomingStockGrowers'Association(WSGA), or-

ganizeda smallarmedmilitia.The purposeofthemilitia,as theorganizerslaterclaimed,was to clearnorthern
Wyomingof rustlers-itwas
It was on
oftherangecattlefirms.
theprivateproperty
simplytoprotect
the
U.S.
West
thisbasis thattheWSGA recruited
gunmenthroughout
had broadergoals
andmobilizedin Cheyenne.However,theorganizers
rustlers.
on
thansimplyto imposevigilante
Theywantedto overjustice
in thecounty,takecharge
throwthenewlyemerging
politicalstructure
the
of the courthouse,
and, as such,
legal process.Withthe rise in
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and subsequentdecreasein politicalinfluence
homesteader
settlement
of theinof thecattleindustry,
especiallywiththefinancialdownturn
in thelate 1880s,thesebusinessmen
feltthattheirrightswereindustry
to convictindiTheyhad all butgivenup trying
adequatelyprotected.
decided
insteadto
and
vidualsof stealingtheirproperty,
usuallycattle,
via armedconflict.
reestablish
theirinfluence
On 6 April1892 themilitiabeganits 120-milemarchto Buffalo,the
seatofJohnson
County.Whileinroute,themilitiacameacrosssomealrustlers
at
a ranch50 milessouthof Buffalo.Aftera heateddeleged
on
beforecontinuing
bate,themilitiadecidedto deal withthe"rustlers"
totheirintended
destination.
Expectedto lastbuta fewhours,itevolved
intoa disastrousdaylongordeal.This delaycostthemilitiatheadvantageof surpriseas thenewsof the"invading"militiaalongwithitsintentreachedBuffalo.'Red Angus,thecountysheriff,
quicklyorganized
the
a counterforceofover200 menwhorodeoutto meetandneutralize
militia.Upon hearingof the approachingforce,the militiafortified
at a local ranchhouse.Whennewsof thesiege leakedout,
themselves
President
Hardingto send
successfully
petitioned
Wyoming'sgovernor
All
the
to
rescue
besiegedmilitia.2 of the militia
government
troops
memberswere arrestedand held firstat FortMcKinneyand thenin
freed,manyoftheranchesowned
Cheyenne.Whileall wereeventually
taken.3
wereransackedandtheirproperty
bytheorganizers
Knowntodayas theJohnson
CountyWarof 1892,theseeventsform
thehistoricbasis formanyof thepopularfilmdepictionsof theU.S.
withthe originalVirginian(1914) to Shane (1953) to
West,starting
historians
Heaven'sGate(1980). Furthermore,
arguethattheywereimin Wyoming,
influencstructure
altered
the
becausethey
political
portant
D. F. Baberarguesin theprefaceto his
Moreover,
ingthefallelections.4
whichmarks
becauseitis ". .. theconflict
bookthattheWaris important
thedividinglinebetweentheold West,undertheruleof thebig cattle
The stateRepubkings,andthenewWestofthepioneerhomesteader."5
of therangecattle
associatedwiththeinterests
licanPartywas strongly
and,as such,paida politicalpriceforthe"war."
industry
theleadersdidnotinwas keptsecretto gaintheadvantageof surprise,
Whiletheoperation
wereincludedin themilitiaentourage
tendto remainanonymous.
(Larson,History,
Reporters
p. 274).
2 The local ranchwas theTA ranchlocated13 milessouthwest
ofFortMcKinney.The initial
of
counterforcearrivedat theranchon 11 April,andgovernment
troopsarrivedon themorning
betweenthearrivalof thecounterforceand thearrival
13 April.A totalof twodaystranspired
ofgovernment
troops.
p. 279
3 Larson,History,
oftheDemocraticandPopulistspartiesin
themerging
4 Ibid.,pp. 284-92. The warprompted
Aftertheelection,Democratscarriedall butLaramieCounty.
Wyoming.
5 Baber,LongestRope,preface.

This content downloaded on Wed, 9 Jan 2013 13:03:15 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

HighNoon

71

thewarwas a disputeoverland,andit is commonto deEssentially,
all
such
land
ratherthan
pict
disputesin thewestas resolvedviolently
peacefullythroughnegotiation.On the otherhand,recentwork by
economistshas shownthattheWestmaynothave been as violentas
popularlybelieved.6Moreover,TerryAndersonand FredMcChesney
arguethatwhatviolencedid occurresultedfromthecalculationsof rathatnot all
tional,utility-maximizing
They demonstrate
individuals.7
land conflictsresultin violence.To understand
theresolution
of land
out
the
conditions
for
individuals
to
resort
disputes,theylay
necessary
to violencerather
thannegotiation.
Thisarticlefollowsthatapproachto
the
Johnson
War
as
a conflict
betweentworationalananalyze
County
in a landdispute:ranchers,
definedas largerangecattlefirms,
tagonists
andhomesteaders,
definedas farmers
andsmallcattleranchers.
The fundamental
conflictwas controlof the public domain.Over
severaldecades,ranchershad developeduse rightsto therange.However,in thelate 1880s,homesteaders
beganto migrateontothepublic
domainclaimingportionsoftherangeundervariousfederallandacts,
themostnotablebeingtheHomesteadAct of 1862. However,thismigrationrarelylead to thetypeof organizedviolenceseen in theJohnson CountyWar.To identify
thekeyparameters
whether
the
affecting
conflictendsin violence,thearticleuses a variationof a modeldevelin theBrazilianAmazon.8In thismodel,
oped to analyzelandconflicts
ranchersmustdecideon thelevel of effort
to expendin resisting
invasionor evictinghomesteaders
onceoccupancyoccurs.Simultaneously,
homesteaders
mustchoosethelevel ofeffort
to expendon invadingan
of
occupiedrangeor resistingeviction.We arguethattheprobability
violenceincreaseswhenefforts
forevictionand resistanceincreases.
As such,thearticleexplainswhythisviolencetookplace in Johnson
Countyand in 1892.
CATTLE, LAND, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

The rangecattleindustry
dominated
businessin Wyoming
duringthe
1880s. For the time,cattleconcernswere large enterprises
oftenfinanced by foreigncapital.Productionmethodswere land intensive
baseduponusufruct
rightsin landandfeesimpletitleto cattle.Invested
of cattlewithonlya smallproportion
capitalconsistedalmostentirely
of land held in fee simple.Moreover,thepracticeof grazingcattleon
the range untilready for marketexhibitssubstantialeconomiesof
6 Anderson
andHill,NotSo

Wild,WildWest.

andMcChesney,"Raid."
7 Anderson
8

Alston,Libecap,andMueller,"LandReformPolicies."
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scale.9To takeadvantageof this,cattlemen
grazedcattlecommunally
on thepublicrangeand conducted
jointroundups.This organizational
to theinputsof
structure
withitsmixof publicand privateownership
was thedirectoutcomeoffederallandlaws.
production
suchas minimum
Marketimperfections
pricefloorsand acreageconmarkettransacstraints
alongwithbureaucratic
impediments
prevented
issue.However,in theearlydetionsfromsolvingtheland ownership
of theindustry
thesewerenotbindingconstraints
giventhe
velopment
initialnonscarcity
of land.Rangeuse allocationsoccurredby thecommonlaw doctrine
ofpriorappropriation
wherebyindividualssetup optheirintent.
Once such
erationsby claiminga rangeandpubliclystating
read
proclamation
thepublicthatI claimthevalley,branching
do herebynotify
I, theundersigned,
offtheGlendiveCreek,fourmileseastof Allard,andextending
to itssourceon
the Southside of theNorthern
PacificRailroadas a stockrange.- Chas. S.
10
Johnson.

Forthemostpart,an informal
network
ofcodesandcustomsofthewest
were credibleenough
evolvedto protectuse rights.These protections
suchthatuse rightsobtainedmarket
valueandwerefullytransferable."
the
conditions
mid-1880s,
changedsuch thatinformalarrangeBy
inprotecting
withthe
mentsbecameless effective
Homesteaders,
rights.
of
title
to
into
this
came
land,
existingsystemof use
promise legal
used
claimson rangesalreadyextensively
rightsandbeganestablishing
it
cattlemen
found
economicattlemen.
As
increased,
by
competition
cally viableto devoteadditionalresourcesto altertheexistinginstitutional framework
governingrangeuse. Early on, cattlemenlobbied
of
Congressto alterfederallandlaws to alignbetterwiththeconditions
thearidwestwherea cow requiredfrom20 to 40 acres.If successful,
thiswould allow markettransactions
to preventthistypeof competition.Yet, theirefforts
failedin persuadingCongress.GaryLibecap arobstructed
guesthatCongressandtheGeneralLand Officeintentionally
westerncattlemen's
efforts
to gainlegalrecognition
oftheirestablished
use rights
orto alterexistinglandpolicies.'2Federallandpolicyfavored
StockGrowers
Association,"
910SeeEaton,"Wyoming
p. 136.
Osgood,Day, p. 183.

" See Anderson
ofinformal
andHill,"Evolution";
andEllickson,
Order,fora discussion
InWyoming,
a setofrights
soldfor"something
over$200,000,"
andonecattlecomnetworks.

a valueof $85,000forrangerights:Dennen,FromCommontoPrivateProperty,
panyreported

fordebtsfrom
Morton
Frewen:
theuseof50,000acresinexchange
p. 110.FredHesseobtained
inprotecting
thatearlyarrangements
wereeffective
Sandoz,Cattlemen,
p. 333.Thissuggests
rangerights.
12 Libecap,LockingUp theRange.
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in developing
smallclaimantsovercattlemen
In
politicalconstituencies.
the
this
reflected
desire
to
withsmalllargepart,
populateterritories
scale farmers
foradmissionas newstatesrather
thanestablishing
a moa
fewcattlemen.13
nopolyoverthepublicrangescontrolled
by relatively
In contrast,
the evolutionof federalminingand preemption
laws did
use rights,
whereastheevolutionof fedformally
recognizeestablished
eral land laws neverrecognizedcattlemen's
use rights.This failureto
alterexistingland laws effectively
rendered
cattlemen
on the
squatters
domain.14
public
in
thiswas thepassage of a congressional
resolution
Compounding
1868 thatrepresented
a shiftin federallandpolicyfromone of revenue
to territorial
settlement.
Thiseffectively
endedcash sales and
generation
cattlemen
fromsecuringprivatetitleto enoughlandthrough
prohibited
thisavenue.15Moreover,
underthevariouslandacts
acreagelimitations
fellfarshortoftheminimum
forwestern
conditions.
Cattlerequirement
Actof 1841
mencouldonlyclaima totalof 1,120acres.The Preemption
and theDesertLand Act of 1877 allowedthepurchaseof 160 and 640
acresat a priceof $1.25 peracrerespectively.
UndertheHomesteadAct
of 1862andtheTimberCulture
Actof 1873,an individual
couldclaiman
additional320 acresat a zeropriceperacre.However,thepricefloorof
western
$1.25peracreundertheactswildlyoverpriced
land.'6
Yet theinability
to securelegal titledid notpreventcattlemen
from
their
in
to
informal
institutions
increased
amending
response
competiIn
this
such
alteration
must
lower
the
costs
of
identicontext,
any
tion.iv
for
of
of
cattle
fyingownership rangecattle, gathering
range
branding
and marketing
ownership
rightsto cattlein dispurposes,of protecting
tantmarketsand of controlling
access to theopen range.18The WyomingStockGrowersAssociation(WSGA), themostsuccessfulof all
13

Clawson,UncleSam's Acres,p. 62. Libecaparguesthattheprimary
reasonfortheobstructionwas thattheLand Office'sbudgetdependedon case loads processed.To increasetheir
budget,theLand Officehadto increaseworkload.Thisfavoredthesmalllandclaimantoverthe
land-intensive
rancher.
14 Thisis notunlikethesituation
inmuchofSouthAmericaas notedbyDesoto,Mystery.
15 Hibbard,
History,
p. 111. Gates,"HomesteadLaw," arguesthatcash sale oflandcontinued
statelandgrants,Indian
after1868 usingcommutation
ofhomesteadentriesunderpreemption,
lands,and otherFederallands.However,thisdoes notappearto have been a viableoptionin
undertheseentries.
ofthepublicdomainwas transferable
Onlysmallfraction
Wyoming.
16Dennenestimatestheopen marketvalue of land at less thantencentsper acre.Dennen,
FromCommontoPrivateProperty,
p. 9.
17 See Andersonand Hill, "Evolution"and "Race"; and Andersonand Grewell,"Property
on the western
RightsSolutions,"fora completediscussionof the evolutionof institutions
range.
StockGrowersAssociation,"p. 133. These issues are theresultof the
18 Eaton,"Wyoming
ofthe
theissue of openaccess andthetragedy
communalgrazingon publicland.In particular,
commonsthatcouldresultfroma failureto controlrangeuse.
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stockassociationsin theU.S. West,emergedin thisrespectas thepritoregulateWyoming
theTerritomaryinstitution
rangesanddominated
rial Legislature.In 1882, 55 percentof the legislatorswere stockmen
withat leastone-third
beingmembersof theWSGA, whilethelegislativecommittee
thestockindustry
had an associationmemconcerning
beras itschairbetween1875and 1890.19
The WSGA, through
legislativeacts and internalactivities,created
an institutional
framework
to governthe Wyomingrange.Acts between 1869 and 1884 vestedcontroloverregistering
of brandswith
the WSGA, and the Maverick Law addressed ownershipof unbrandedrangecattle(mavericks)and thenegativeexternalities
associated withindividualroundups.20This law, passed in 1884, established a communalroundupunderthe legal controlof the WSGA.
The associationhad theauthority
to determine
thetimingof and participationin a communalroundupalongwiththebrandingof mavericks. Internally,
the WSGA createdan inspectionand detectivebureau fundedprimarily
fromthesale of mavericksto protectrightson
therangeand in distantmarkets.At its height,thebureauemployed
22 inspectorsand detectives and had an operatingbudget of
$946,916.21 Moreover,underthe influenceof the association,Wyomingevolved intoa fenceout stateratherthanfencein as underthe
commonlaw. Cattlemenwere liable fordamagesonlyif theircattle
breacheda lawfulenclosure.This shiftingof the liabilitymade it
to setup claimson therangegiventheinitial
costlyforhomesteaders
cost
of
traditional
high
fencingmaterials.
in the annualroundup,the association
By controlling
participation
controlledaccess to therange.Membershiprequiredthe sponsorship
of a current
WSGA memberand approvalofthemembership
committee. The associationwas not shyaboutblacklisting
or denyingmemThisall butenbershipto individualsitconsideredof "bad character."
sured thatthe individualcould not participatein the roundup.All
mavericksgatheredduringtheroundupessentiallybecame thepropcattlegatheredwereconfisertyof theWSGA and anynonmember's
19

See Jackson,
"WyomingStockGrowers'Association,"fora fulldiscussionofthepolitical
activities
oftheWSGA.
StockGrowersAssociation.By-Laws,fora completediscussionof Wyo20 See Wyoming
of grassand overstressing
mingStockLaws. Communalroundupsavoid excessivetrampling
cattleassociatedwithindividualroundups.However,communalgrazingcreatesan incentive
to
brandcattlefirst.Once branded,a maverickbecomestheproperty
of theownerof thebrand.
thedoctrineof presumptive
addressedthisincentiveby allocatingmaverInitially,
ownership
icksundervariousrulessuchas proportional
allotment.
Thisagreement
beganto breakdownas
therangesbecamecrowded.The mavericklaw attempted
to overcamethisbyvestingthepower
tobrandwiththeWSGA.
21 2005 dollars.See Table 3.
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cated and sold at auction.22
The effectiveresultof controlover the
made
it
to
roundup
costly operatea cattlefirmon a rangewithoutbeingan associationmember.
By 1884 the WSGA controlledaccess to the open rangethrough
and theMaverickLaw. However,duringthelaterpartof
membership
the decade, the principlecompetition
forrangeuse was small stock
and
farmers
known
as "grangers."
The largest
ranchers,
sheepherders,
and Crookcoungrangercommunity
developedin Sheridan,Johnson,
ties were due to geographicalconditions.23
Farm operationsin the
northeast
offarmacreage
weresmalleranddevoteda largerproportion
to traditional
cerealcropscomparedto thestatewideaverage.24Farms
in thesouthern
used for
portionof thestatewerelargerand primarily
winterhay forrangecattle.This patternof farmsettlement
supports
FrankCanton'sassertionthat"I expectto have a veryheavyrace to
run,as myopponentis a grangerand thatelementhas themajorityin
thiscounty"whenhe ran forJohnsonCountySheriff.25
By 1890 the
of settlement
indicatesa higherproportion
ofthepopulationin
pattern
thenortheast
to
direct
the
competitors
openrangesystemthanin
being
thesouth.
Beginningin themid 1880s,severalchangesoccurredthatbeganto
unraveltheinstitutional
The electionof President
Clevearrangement.
land in 1884 and appointment
of WilliamSparksas Commissioner
of
theGeneralLand Officerepresented
a shiftin thefederalgovernment's
In addition,thewinterof
supportof homesteaders
againstranchers.26
1886/87leftmanycattlemen
and
bankrupt, manyquitthebusinessaltointheWSGA droppedfrom349 to 183 in 1889.As
gether.
Membership
of nonmember's
cattle
increased,the confiscation
rangecompetition
became a seriousissue and theMaverickLaw came underincreasing
In 1891thelegislature
assaultin thelegislature.
repealedthelaw,reprereductionin the association'sabilityto protect
sentinga significant
theterritorial
and
rangerights rightsin cattle.Additionally,
legislature
divestedtheWSGA of directcontrolovertheroundupwhenit transto a newlycreatedBoardof LivestockCommissioners.
ferred
authority
22

Ownersof confiscated
cattlecouldpetition
theWSGA fortheremittance
ofthefundsgenwhatevidencewouldbe
eratedfromtheirconfiscated
cattle.However,theWSGA controlled
considered
proofofownership.
23 Viable farming
in thearidWestrequiredsteadywaterflowsforirrigation
alongwithlow
construction
costsof irrigation
canals.Northeast
Wyomingprovidedadequatesummerwater
flowand thecostof constructing
canalswas lowerthanin therestof Wyoming:U.S. Census
Bureau.ReportonAgriculture,
pp. 248-54.
24 Thisis evident
inTable 5.
25 Quoted in Larson,History,p. 188. FrankCantonwas at one timea detectiveforthe
WSGA.
26 Libecap,LockingUp theRange,p. 32.
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at thetimeindicatesthatthisshiftof decision-making
The sentiment
to
andmavericking.27
led
increased
cattletheft
power
Withrespectto theillegalfencingquestion,theJusticeDepartment
handledearlycases,butwithlimitedsuccess.28
However,thepassageof
theIllegalInclosureAct in 1885 strengthened
thegovernment's
ability
to removeillegal inclosures.29
In UnitedStatesv. Bradford,
thecourt
underthepretense
usingtheIllegalInclosureActruledthatindividuals
ofinclosingtheirownlandcouldnotinclosepubliclandas well.30
controlover
By theendofthe1880s,theWSGA had lostsubstantial
access to therangeand protection
of cattlefromtheftbeganto breakof the
down at an increasingpace.31Indeed,the financialdifficulties
of the
WSGA afterthewinterstormsof 1886/87forcedthedisbanding
detective
and inspection
bureauin 1888.The finalstrawwas theformationoftheNorthemWyoming
Farmersand StockGrowersAssociation
in 1892.Thisassociationrepresented
an allianceof smallstockgrowers
and grangersthatwas in directcompetition
to the WSGA. They announceda separateroundupone monthpriorto thelegalroundup.This
struckat theheartofWSGA powerandwas theeventthattriggered
the
efforts
to organizea militiasettingthe stage forthe aforementioned
Johnson
CountyWarof 1892.
A MODEL FORANALYZINGCONFLICT
InNot all competition
overlanduse ends in violentconfrontation.
of Wyomingis a case in point.Exceptforisolatedindeed,thehistory
thevastmajority
and
cidencesoflynching
andvigilantism,
ofWyoming
fromthepublicdomainintopritheU.S. Westpeacefullytransferred
vateownership.32
to
the
lead
Johnson
What,then,
CountyWarof 1892?
To setouttheseconditions,
we use a modeldevelopedto analyzeconflictin the BrazilianAmazonby Lee Alston,Libecap,and Bernardo
Mueller.33
27

Larson,History,
p. 269.
Ibid.,p. 179. Cattlemen
fencesin an effort
to excludegrangersfrom
beganto construct
theirranges.In theprocess,cattlemen
inclosedsubstantial
ofthepublicdomainas well.
portions
See Larson,History,
p. 32, fora fulldiscussionofillegalfencing.
29 48thCong.Ch. 149; 23 Stat.321.
30 8 Utah173,30 P 433.
31 Larson,History,
p. 271. Smith,War,pp. 116-17.
32 See Anderson
andHill,NotSo Wild,WildWest.
setup thepoten33Alston,Libecap,Mueller,"LandReformPolicies."In Brazil,landreforms
tialforconflict
whoheldlegaltitleto thelandand landlesspeasants.Many
betweenindividuals
timesthisconflict
foran inresultedin violence;theirmodellaysoutthenecessaryconditions
creasein theprobability
of violence.However,theHomesteadAct encouragedoccupationof
landheldbytheFederalgovernment
thatwas largelyunoccupied.In Brazil,thelevelofviolent
confrontation
was muchgreater
thanin theAmericanWest.The levelofconfrontation
resulting
28
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In contrast
to Brazil,Wyoming
ranchers
occupiedlargetractsofpublic landand homesteaders
in
efforts
to invadeand occupythis
engaged
land. To simplify
the analysis,we assumethe antagonists
to
attempt
maximizeland value and only two outcomesare possible.Eithera
theuse ofthelandandthehomesteader
ranchermaintains
loses theuse
invadeand successfully
resisteviction,in
of theland or homesteaders
whichcase therancher
loses theuse oftheland.34In eithercase,neither
fortheirlostuse oftheland.Therefore,
theprobreceivescompensation
lem facingbothranchersand homesteaders
is to choose the optimal
level of effort
to expendon obtaininguse of thedisputedland.Let v
the
level
of activity
to maintaintheuse of land.
represent
by ranchers
These efforts
includeactivitiesdesignedto resistinitialoccupancyand
to
efforts evictonce occupancyoccurs.35
Let s denotethelevelofeffort
to occupytherangeand resistcattlemen's
expendedby homesteaders
efforts
to evictthemfromtherange.If bothv ands increasesimultanethen
theprobability
of resolvingland disputesthrough
violent
ously,
taskis to determine
meansincreases.The important
underwhatconditionsbothv ands increasesimultaneously.
The probability
thatranchersmaintaintheuse of disputedland dethe
on
level
of v supplied,thelevel of support
fromstateandlopends
cal government
(bothlegislativeandjudicial)k,andtherelativepopulation(ranchers
tohomesteaders),
n. We writethisprobability
as:
fl(v,k,n) wherefv> O,fk> O,fin> O, vv< 0,fkk< 0, fnn< 0

(1)

a rancher'sabilityto
augments
Supportfromstateandlocal government
resistinvasionand to evicthomesteaders.36
Duringtheearlydevelopmentof Wyoming,
in develtheterritorial
was instrumental
legislature
of a rancher'scattleand estabopingits stocklaws fortheprotection
to therange.The MaverickLaw was theprimary
lishingentrybarriers
stocklaw used by ranchersto controlentry.Judicialsupportfurther
fromtheHomesteadActwouldnotreachthelevel in Braziluntilthemigration
of farmers
ena systemdevelopedforthearidconditions
of theWest.However,we believeit apcountered
to use a modeldevelopedto analyzea situation
whereviolencewas morecommonto
propriate
whereviolencewas less commonas in theAmericanWest.
analyzea situation
34 These assumptions
are equivalentto the Alstonet al. model derivedin theirappendix.
has legal titleto theland ratherthantherancheras in theAlston
However,thehomesteader
model.
35 This specification
in thatefforts
of v is moregeneralthanAlston'sspecification
to protect
to occupytherangeand
homesteader's
efforts
cattlemen'suse rightsto land includeresisting
onceactualoccupationoccurred
rather
thansimpleevictionefforts.
evictinghomesteaders
36In ourmodelk is an exogenousparameter
thateitherenhancesor diminishes
theefforts
of
ranchersin protecting
theirlegal rightsto property
suchas cattle.In theBraziliancontext,
the
roleofthecourtsis theprotection
oftheowners'legalrightstothelanditself.
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rightsin cattle.Local courtscouldeitherenforce
strengthened
property
thestocklaws such as theMaverickLaw or choose to look theother
increasestheprobabilway.Anyincreasein local governmental
support
theuse ofthelandbyranchers.
ityofmaintaining
of n affectstheexpectedoutcomeof a violentconThe distribution
theoutcomeis cerAt thetwoextremes
of thedistribution,
frontation.
then
homesteaders
are
notlikelyto waste
tain.If n is sufficiently
high,
resourcesfightingevictiongiven thatthe expectedoutcomefavors
low n rancherswould not
ranchers.On the otherhand,at sufficiently
wasteresourcesresisting
and evictinghomesteaders
giventhattheextwo points,howoutcome
favors
homesteaders.
Between
these
pected
and theexpectedoutcome
ever,theoutcomeof a disputeis uncertain
It is in thisrangethatviolent
norhomesteaders.
favorsneither
ranchers
In otherwords,whentherelativepopulationis
is likely.37
confrontation
neither
too "high"nor"low" theoutcomefromusingviolenceto settle
disputesis uncertain.
eithatthefederalgovernment
Whatis more,theprobability
through
or themiliof theInterior,
theJusticeDepartment,
thertheDepartment
also affectstheabilityof
on behalfof homesteaders
tarywill intervene
ofthree
ranchers
to maintain
theuse ofdisputedland.Thisis a function
thelevel of security
variables;thelevel ofs suppliedby homesteaders;
ofa rancher'sproperty
fortheprincirights,
p; andthepoliticalsupport
the
ofthefederal
behind
Homestead
Act
The
itself,
ples
g.38
probability
is givenbyequation2.
againstranchers
government
intervening
O(s,p, g), whereOs>> , Ops
Op< ,

> 0, O < , Opp< 0, Ogg< 0

(2)

Combiningequations1 and 2, one can writethe ranchers'expected
valuefunction
theuse oftherangeas
frommaintaining
+ (1 -fl(v,k,n)
EVR= P(v,k,n)L
[1 - O(s,P,G)]L - C(v),
whereCv > 0

(3)

similarto thatof Allen ("Homesteading")
wherehe arguedthatrelative
of disputesbetweenwhitesand Indiansin settling
theWest.
populationis a criticalcomponent
into
He arguedthattheU.S. government
usedtheHomesteadActas a methodofrushingsettlers
a territory,
couldbytherelativepopulationto a pointwherethefederalgovernment
increasing
pass thezone of violence.In our context,we arguethatthiszone of violenceexistedto the
extentinthenortheast
portionofthestatein 1892.
greatest
38 In Brazilian
towardslandreform
in
theattitude
oftheLand Authority
context,
g represents
to expropriate
ownedland.In our
in theirattempt
theefforts
of squatters
privately
supporting
in invading
of theDepartment
of theInterior
towardsthesettler'sefforts
case, it is theattitude
andresisting
evictionfromlandto whichtheymayholdlegal rights.In ourmodel,p has a difthataroseon theplainsin proIt is thestrength
of extralegalinstitutions
ferent
interpretation.
forour studywas The Wyoming
tectinga rancher'suse rights.The mostnotableinstitution
StockGrowersAssociation.
37 This analysisis
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froma successfulevicThe firsttermrepresents
theexpectedreturns
if
term
is
the
loss
eviction
fail.L is
and
the
second
efforts
tion,
expected
forsupplying
unitsof v,
thevalue of landand C(v) is thecostfunction
>
v
the
is to
in
with
0.
The
of
rancher
whichis increasing
C,
goal
theobchoosethelevelof v thatmaximizesequation3. Differentiating
withrespectto v yieldstherancher'sfirstordercondijectivefunction
tiongivenbyequation4.
=
/f 0(s,p,G)]L- C(v) 0

(4)

themarginalbenefitand cost of supplying
units
Equation4 represents
andP, is the
ofv. 0(s,p,g)]Lis theexpectedloss avoidedbytherancher,
the
withrein
of
homesteader
increase
the
probability evicting
marginal
The rancherbalancesthisgain againstthe
spectto increasesin effort.
cost,C,.
marginal
s that
thehomesteader
willchoosethelevelofeffort,
Simultaneously
maximizesthefollowing
expectedvaluefunction
- C(s),
EVH= (1 - f(v,k,n))O(s,p,g)]L
whereCs> 0 andC, > 0

(5)

theprobability
of a successThe firsttermin the equationrepresents
ofinfullyoccupyingtherange,and thesecondtermis theprobability
tervention
Togetherwiththevalue of the
by the federalgovernment.
from
landL, thistermrepresents
theexpectedpayofftothehomesteader
The lasttermis
evictionbyranchers.
occupyingtherangeandresisting
ofthehomesteader.
Thisfunction
thecostfunction
fromtheperspective
in s. The goal ofthehomesteader
is to choosetheoptimal
is increasing
thisobjectivefunclevelofs thatmaximizesequation5. Differentiating
tionwithrespecttos yieldsequation6, whichis thefirstordercondition
forthehomesteader.
- Cs = 0
[(1 -Pf(v,k,n))]OsL

(6)

interA marginalincreasein theprobability
of thefederalgovernment
vening,0s, timesthevalue ofthelandgivesthemarginalbenefitof anunitofhomesteader
efcostofanother
otherunitofs. Cs is themarginal
fort.The homesteader
balancesthegainfromtheuse ofthelandagainst
thecostofinvadingandresisting
evictionefforts.
As in the Alstonet al. model,thejoint solutionof the individual
maximization
wherethelevel of
problemsproducea Nash equilibrium
v* and s* are such thatbothequation4 and equation6 hold
efforts
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TABLE1
IMPACTS OF CHANGES IN EXOGENOUS VARIABLES ON THE OPTIMAL
LEVEL OF VAND S

Increase in propertyrights,p

Increasein landvalue,L
Increaseincost,C
fromfederalgovernment,
Increasein support
g
k
fromlocal government,
Increasein support
n
Increaseinrelativepopulation,

Impacton ReactionCurve

Impacton

Rancher Homesteader

v

s

+

+

+

+

+

+
+
+

+

+

+

Note:See equations1-6.

thefirstorderconditionswithrespect
simultaneously.
Differentiating
derivato each parameter
ofthemodeland solvingfortheunderlying
tivesyieldsthereactionfunctionforeach playerin theland dispute.
how each player
Establishingtheirslope is criticalin understanding
holdingtheexogerespondsto changesin theother'slevel of effort,
to demonstrate
that
nous parametersconstant.It is straightforward
the slope of thehomesteader'sreactionfunctionis negativewithrespectto changesin v whereastherancher'sis positivewithrespectto
changesin s forany given set of exogenousparameters.39In other
words,rancherswill respondto increasesin s by supplyingmore v
will supplyless s in responseto increasesin v, all
buthomesteaders
else constant.
CriticalforanalyzingtheJohnsonCountyWar is how the optimal
levelsofs andv respondsto changesin theparameters
n,k,p, g, L, and
staticanalyC. To ascertaintheseeffects,
we conducteda comparative
Table 1 containstheresults
sis of each of theexogenousparameters.
fromthis analysis.40 Changes in exogenousparametersshifteach
As a result,
thechangein eithers or v willbe
player'sreactionfunction.
for
one
but
for
unambiguous
ambiguous theother.For example,an increase in n shiftsthe rancher'sfunction
to the rightand the homein
1.
steader'sfunction
to theleftas Figure Homesteaders
respondby
in
v
less
but
the
is
s,
change
ambiguous.The
unambiguously
supplying
the
is thattwo effectsoperateon therancher,
sourceof theambiguity
The directeffectis theshiftofthereaction
directandtheindirect
effect.
39 For a derivation
see Alstonet al., "Land Reform
of theslopes of each reactionfunction,
Policies."
40
These resultsare identicalto theresultsof theAlstonmodelexceptthatwe deviatefrom
of an evictionas a function
of theprotheAlstonmodelby explicitly
modelingtheprobability
For a derivation
of theresultswithrespectto n, see the
portionof ranchersto homesteaders.
see Alstonetal.,"LandReformPolicies."
Appendix.Fortheotherparameters,
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FIGURE1

THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN N
Note:TermsaredefinedinTable 1.

thatincreasesv foranygivenlevelofs. However,s unambigufunction
ouslyfalls.Giventhepositiveslope of therancher'sreactionfunction,
thesupplyofv,whichis the
theyrespondto a decreaseins byreducing
indirect
effect.41
As a result,theoptimallevelofv dependson therelashiftdominates
tiveshiftsof thereactioncurves.If thehomesteader's
the rancher's,thenthe impacton bothv and s is negative.In other
words,an increasein therelativepopulationmakestheoutcomeofviolence morecertain,whichlowersthe likelihoodof violenceand vice
versa.
statements
on theoptimallevel of v*and s*,the
To makedefinitive
ofthereactioncurveswithrespectto changesin each
relativeelasticity
of which
variable
mustbe known.Clearly,thedetermination
exogenous
is an empirical
issue.In theabsenceofdataand
partyis moreresponsive
41 This resultof a directand indirect
effectsin the
effectis identicalto directand strategic
Alstonmodel.
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in orderto determine
effectsfromchangesin parameters
unambiguous
we assumethathomesteaders
arealwaysmoresensitive
to changesinpathanranchers.
In otherwords,homesteader
rameters
reactioncurvesare
than
for
those ranchers.42
The simplerationalefor
alwaysmoreelastic
thisassumption
is giventhatthehomestead
was, in mostcases,a homesteader'sentirecapitalwhereasitwas a smallfraction
fora rancher
then
tochangesinparameters.
homesteaders
willbe moresensitive
Table1 laysoutthenecessary
conditions
foran increaseintheprobabilthat
in
landdisputes.For
individuals
will
resort
to
violence
ity
resolving
thisto occur,thesupplyof v and s mustincreasesimultaneously.
Both
ranchers
andhomesteaders
willincreasetheirsupplyofv ands ifthevalue
oflandorthesupport
fromthefederal
increases.
Furthermore,
government
cost
theywillincreasetheirsupplyofv ands ifproperty
rights
protection,
of supplying
from
local
or
relative
effort,
support
government,
population
decrease.We willarguethatall six parameters
that
changedin a manner
increasedtheprobability
thatranchers
and homesteaders
wouldresortto
violenceinsettling
theirdisputeoverlandinJohnson
County.
EVIDENCE
In the followingsection,we lay out the shiftsforeach exogenous
variablein themodelandtheirimplication
fortheJohnson
Countywar
of 1892.
L, Land Values
The valueoflandforagricultural
ofthreevaripurposesis a function
ables: thevalue of theoutputproduced,cost of transportation
to marof land.In thiscontext,
kets,and themarginalproductivity
outputvalues increased,
costsfell,andthemarginalproductivity
of
transportation
land
increased
relative
to
territories.
We
conWyoming
surrounding
structed
threeindexesto demonstrate
theincreasein thevalue of land
with1880 thebase year.The firstis a weightedaverageofthevalue of
theyieldper acre forprimary
cerealcrops,and the secondand third
measurechangesin cattlevaluesandtransportation
costsrespectively.43
theindexesfor1880through
1900. Severaltrendsare
Figure2 presents
worthnoting.By 1891,cattlepricesexperienced
a 29.16 percentdecline
42 Thisassumption
playsthesameroleas theAlstonet al. assumption
thatthedirecteffectis
thanthestrategic
effect.
alwaysgreater
in
43Acreagesofcom,oats,andwheataccountedfor97 percentofthecerealgrainsharvested
TransporWyomingin 1890.Oats accountedfor67 percentofthetotalcerealgrainsharvested.
tationcostsareaveragefreight
chargesperton-mile.
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FIGURE 2

COMMODITY

VALUES AND TRANSPORTATION

COSTS, 1880 TO 1900

Source:Statistical
Abstract
ofUnitedStates,1900.

fromtheirpeak in 1884. Croppricesincreased37.7 percent,
and transcostsfellby 37.45 percentbetween1884 and 1891. As indiportation
cated in Figure2, changingoutputvalues and transportation
costsincreasedtherateofreturn
toWyoming
lands.
Withrespectto themarginalproductivity
of land in Wyoming,
the
oflandsinNebraskaand
factorwas themarginal
important
productivity
Kansas.By 1892,thecombinedpopulationofKansas andNebraskaapproached2.5 millionwithsome 20 millionacres containedin homeof land in
steads.As populationincreased,the marginalproductivity
of land in
these statesdecreased.In turn,the marginalproductivity
Wyomingincreasedrelativeto lands in Kansas and Nebraska.This
increasedthevalue of landin
changein relativemarginalproductivity
Wyoming.
thereactionfunctions
forbothranchers
landvaluesshifted
Increasing
and homesteaders
to theright.The impacton theoptimallevel of v is
unambiguously
positive.Ranchersrespondto thesechangesby increastheir
at resisting
and evictinghomesteaders
efforts
giventhepayoff
ing
to suchactivitiesincreased.On theotherhand,theimpacton s is amincreased,but the optimallevel
biguous.The payoffto homesteaders
function
ofvalso increased.As long as theshiftof thehomesteader's
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TABLE2
REAL COST OF BARBED WIRE FENCING, 1874-1897
Year

Costper 100Pounds

1874
1880
1885
1890
1897
Change1874-1897(percent)
Source:Webb,GreatPlains,p. 310.

308.17
198.02
86.21
70.81
39.88
-87

therancher'sshift,
thentheimpacton theoptimallevelsofv
dominates
ands willbe positiveincreasing
theprobability
ofviolence.
C, Per UnitCostofSupplying
Effort
One obstaclefacingbothhomesteaders
and ranchersin maintaining
matheuse of landwas thecostof fencingwesternplains.Traditional
terialssuchas stoneand wood werescarce,raisingtheircost substanofa low costmethodofproducing
barbedwirein
tially.The invention
1874 significantly
loweredthe cost of constructing
fences on the
In
the
and
this
lowered
cost
for
both
ranchers
homesteadplains. turn,
ers in assertingand defending
theirclaimsto disputedland. Without
this invention,
the rate of returnto farmingin the West was much
to protecthis cropsfromdamagedue
lowerdue to a farmer'sinability
state.Simulthat
to trespassing
cattle,given
Wyomingwas a fence-out
taneously,rancherscould protecttheirexistingrangesfromintruding
homesteaders.
Table 2 presentsthetrendin the cost of barbedwirefencingfrom
decreased87 percent
1874to 1897.The realcostofbarbedwirefencing
overthisperiod.This shifted
homesteaders'
reactioncurveto theright
the
level
of
s.
could
now moveontothearid
They
increasing optimal
stakea homesteadclaim,and protecttheirinvestplainsof Wyoming,
mentfromdamagecaused by rangecattleat a reasonablylow cost,
therateof return
to a Wyomingfarm.Ranchersrethereby
increasing
spondto increasesin s by slidingup theirreactioncurvegivenitspositiveslope.The dropin fencecostsincreasedtheoptimalsupplyofs and
ofviolence.
v leadingto an increaseintheprobability
p, Property
Rights
whichopenrangeranchers
institution
The primary
through
protected
in cattleandrangerightswas theWSGA thatprovided
theirinvestment
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TABLE3
DETECTIVES, INSPECTORS AND REAL EXPENDITURES, 1880-1894
Year

DetectivesandInspectors

DetectiveBureaua

3
1880
1881
3
1882
7
1883
13
67,965
1884
12
439,827
1885
22
519,053
14
1886
312,041
13
1887
355,223
10
1888
348,097
1889
9
8
1890
8
1891
8
1892
1893
7
1894
7
a Blankcells indicatethatthedatawerenotavailableforthat
year.
Source:FinancialStatements
oftheWyomingStockGrowersAssociation

a
Inspections

126,968
259,732
278,466
427,863
484,187
287,156
206,688

222,355

essentialinspection
and detective
services.Table 3 providesdataon the
and real expenditures
forthesesernumberof inspectors
and detectives
Data
are
for
the
number
with
mostcomplete
vices.
employed a highof22
in 1885 followedby a 68 percentdeclineby 1894.Expenditures
fordetectiveservicespertainto theyears1883 to 1888.Real expenditures
for
detectiveservicespeakedin 1885 and declinedby 32 percentby 1888
whentheWSGA disbandedthebureau.Furthermore,
between1882 and
forinspection
servicesdeclined54 percent.
1894realexpenditures
As is evidentin Table3, expenditures
forenforcement
steadactivities
until
In
increased
1886.
the
aftermath
of
the
winter
storm
of
1886,
ily
mostlargecattleoutfits
werebankrupt.
TheWSGA founditselfinsimilar
financial
bureau
shapeandby 1887couldno longerfinancethedetective
due to decliningmembership
and revenues.Whileexpenditures
forintheir
of
services
never
continued,
they
high 1886.
spection
approached
P causingan outThese changesrepresent
a decreasein theparameter
reaction
wardshiftofboththehomesteader's
andrancher's
functions.
As
a result,theoptimallevelsof bothv and s increasedleadingto an increaseintheprobability
ofusingviolencetoresolvelanddisputes.
g,Federal Government
Support
of federalgovernment
interThe primary
changein theprobability
andranchers
ventionin thedisputebetweenhomesteaders
was thepassage of the 1885 Illegal InclosureAct. This act was theprimary
legal
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frominvehicleused by thefederalgovernment
to preventcattlemen
the
domain.
Further
the
homesteaders
were
closing
public
supporting
the electionof PresidentClevelandand the appointment
of Secretary
becamemoreactively
Sparks.Afterthispoint,thefederalgovernment
involvedin the disputebetweenhomesteaders
and ranchers,and the
a legalmethodto intervene.
1885 act gave thefederalgovernment
This
shifted
thereactionfunctions
of bothranchers
and homesteaders
to the
function
domiright.Again,as long as the shiftof thehomesteader's
natestheranchers,
theoptimallevel ofboths and v will increase.As a
thathomesteaders
andranchers
resortto violence
result,theprobability
willincrease.
k,Local Government
Support
fromthecourts,theabilityof cattlemen
to
Withrespectto protection
in local courtsfortheftof cattlewas important.
Eviobtainconvictions
dencefromJohnson
Countycourtrecordsindicatesthatin 1885,of the
ninecases of theftbroughtto trial,fiveresultedin convictions.
Howto trial,noneled to a conviction,
ever,in 1889,ofthe14 cases brought
and thereafter
no cases of theftappearin thecourtrecords.44This indicatesa substantial
declinein theabilityof cattlemen
to obtainconvictionsforstocktheft.
Withdecliningconvictionratesand legislativechangessuch as the
repealof the MaverickLaw and creationof the Board of Livestock
k,fell.As a result,thereCommissioners,
supportof local government
outwhilethefunction
forranchactioncurveforhomesteaders
shifted
ers shiftedin. Unambiguously,
the optimalamountof s suppliedby
homesteaders
increased,buttheeffecton ranchersis ambiguous.With
thathomesteaders
less support,theprobability
will resistevictioneffortsincreases.Ranchersinitially
respondto thefallin k by reducingv,
buttheincreaseins inducesthemto supplymoreefforts
at eviction.As
theshiftofthe
dominates
longas thereactioncurveofthehomesteaders
rancher'scurve,theoptimalvalueofv willincreaseas well.As a result,
of vioboths and v increasedleadingto an increasein theprobability
lencein settling
landdisputes.
n,RelativePopulation
a measureof relativepopulations
one would
To construct
by county,
liketohavedataonindividuals
andfarming,
however,
engagedinranching
44

Smith,War,pp. 116-17.
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TABLE4
STATE LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS, 1890

State

Numberof
a
Farmers

Numberof
a
Cattlemen

Percentage
CropLand

Actual
Relative
Population

Predicted
Relative
Population

Arizona
1.75
1.25
1.25
2,172
2,712
Colorado
7.64
0.26
0.44
20,294
5,297
Montana
3.93
0.79
0.95
5,623
4,427
Nevada
0.93
1.19
1.36
1,643
1,949
New Mexico
7.82
0.67
0.41
10,256
6,832
Utah
9.28
0.20
0.21
12,340
2,418
1.19
1.61
1.33
2,571
4,147
Wyoming
a U.S. Census
Bureau,1890 Census,StatisticsofPopulation,table79, pp. 306-41,and Special
CensusReport,table3, pp. 34-57.

thesedataexistsonlyat thestatelevel forWyomingin 1890. To overcome thislimitation,
we constructed
a prediction
equationbased upon
state-level
datausingthepercentage
offarmland
devotedto cerealcrops
suchas corn,wheat,and oats forsevenwesternstatesas thepredictor.
The presenceof cerealcropsis a strongindicatorof a lowerrelative
for
population.Duringthisperiod,farmers
grewcerealcropsprimarily
marketsale and notas feedforcattle.We use theequationto predicta
county'srelativepopulation.45Table 4 containsstatelevel characteristicsused to developtheprediction
equation.Stateswitha highpercentof
farmland
devoted
to
cereal
also had low relative
age
cropproduction
Arizona,and Nevada were strongcattlestates
populations.Wyoming,
witha relatively
of cattlemen
to farmers,
whereasthe
highproportion
stateshada largerproportion
offarmers
to cattlemen.
remaining
Withrespectto themodel,theimplications
forviolencein Wyoming
are clear. Largerrelativepopulationsled to the expectedoutcomeof
violencefavoringranchersin the southernportionof the state,and
lowerrelativepopulationsled to an uncertain
expectedoutcomein the
In thesouth,thereactionfunction
northeast.
forcattlemen
shiftedoutIn the northeast,
lowerrelative
wards,but inwardsforhomesteaders.
shifted
the
reaction
function
for
homesteaders
outwardand
populations
thatof ranchersinwards.As longas thehomesteaders'
shiftdominates
theranchers'shift,
boths andv willincreasewithlowerrelativepopulationsleadingto a higherprobability
ofviolence,whereastheoppositeis
truewithhigherlevelsofn.
45 The 1890 Censusclassified
cattlemen
as individuals
and
engagedas stockraisers,herders,
droverswhilefarmers
are individuals
who are farmers,
and overseers.The correlation
planters,
coefficient
betweenpercentagecropsand relativepopulationis -0.927 and the coefficient
of
correlation
is -0.7944,indicating
a strongnegativelineardependence
betweenthetwo.The predictionequationis Y= 1.493- 0.13802(X)withan adjustedR2 of0.861.
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TABLE 5

COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS, 1890

County
Crook
Johnson
Sheridan
Albany
Carbon
Converse
Fremont
Laramie
Natrona
Sweetwater
Unita
Weston
StateWide

TotalFarm
Acres

of
Percentage
FarmAcresin
CerealGrains

Predicted
Relative
Population

Population

Average
FarmSize

2,338
2,357
1,972

236
403
350

127,245
123,594
124,749

2.93
2.89
4.07

1.09
1.09
0.93

8,865
6,857
2,738
2,463
16,777
1,094
4,941
7,881
2,422
60,705

1,635
452
916
263
1,912
292
207
362
811
586

214,955
133,241
45,400
96,273
774,161
48,107
4,757
130,330
7,470
1,830,282

0.19
1.11
1.38
3.23
0.27
0.11
0.55
0.46
0.54
1.14

1.47
1.34
1.30
1.05
1.46
1.48
1.42
1.43
1.42
1.34

ofPopulation,
table4, p. 46.
Source:Populationis fromthe1890Census:Statistics

As seen fromTable 5, Crook,Johnson,
and Sheridancounties,comthe
northeast
of
the
state,had relativepopulations
prising
portion
a relatively
of cattlemenand
aroundone indicating
equal distribution
withFrankCanton'sassessmentthat
homesteaders.
This is consistent
grangerscompriseda majorityof JohnsonCounty.46
However,theremainingcountieshad relativepopulationsin excess of one indicating
therelativestrength
of cattlemen.
Based upontherelativepopulations,
in thenortheast
bothranchers
and homesteaders
portionof thestateincreasedtheiroptimallevel ofs and v. This increaseled to an increased
ofviolencein theregion.Moreover,therelativepopulations
probability
weresuchthatfarmers
andranchers
couldformreasonableexpectations
thattheywouldprevailin anyviolentconfrontation.
The evidencepresentedin Table 5 shedslighton whytheleveloforganizedviolenceoccurredin thisregionand notin otherportionsof thestate.Cattlemen
dominated
otherareas,buttheirrelativestrength
was less inthisarea.
CONCLUSION
For decades,historians
andpopularculturedepictedthedevelopment
of theAmericanWest as one of almostcontinualviolence,a lawless
solveddisputes.Recentliterature
has
domainwheregunsand lynching
arguingthatthe regionwas neither
challengedthis characterization
46

QuotedinLarson,History,
p. 188.
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"lawless"noras violentas depicted.Whatis more,theviolencethatdid
thisview
Thisarticlesupports
rareandpredictable.
occurwas relatively
by arguingthatthe JohnsonCountyWar,the seminaleventbetween
whites,thatBaber describesas a transition
pointbetweentheold and
as popularly
new Westwas not the outcomeof irrational
vigilantism
Ratherit was thedirectresultof decisionsmadeby rational
portrayed.
ofuncertainty.
underconditions
individuals
maximizing
utility
theresultof incompatible
The "war,"suchas it was, was ultimately
same
land. Ranchersestabfor
the
property
rightssystemscompeting
lishedan economicsystembased uponusufruct
rightsto land and pristructure
fortheprowith
an
institutional
vaterightsto cattlecomplete
tection of these rights.However, the federal governmentnever
recognizedranchers'claimson thepublicdomain.Moreover,thefedoftheWest
eralgovernment
activelyencouragedsmall-scalesettlement
variousland policiesthatwere well suitedforthehumidrethrough
beof
gions America,butnotthearidregionsofthewest.Thisconflict
in theJohnsonCounty
tweentwo property
rightssystemsculminated
in
the
late
nineteenth
War Wyomingduring
century.
Usinga modelthat
thateveryparameforviolence,we demonstrate
specifiestheconditions
in a
inviolenceshifted
ofa disputeresulting
teraffecting
theprobability
of violence.As such,thisarticle
mannerthatincreasedthatprobability
thatthelevel of organizedviolencereachedin
supportstheargument
the JohnsonCountyWar was predictableand, furthermore,
whythis
rarechoicefor
levelof organizedviolencein theWestwas a relatively
resolving
disputes.

Appendix
thefirstorder
we differentiated
theslopes of thereactionfunctions,
To determine
withrespecteachvariableofthemodelandsolvedfortherespective
conditions
partial
thereactionfunctions.
derivatives.
Equations7 and8 represent
asfvOL

av

v

ds =

(1 -

-

<L
L
ss
)0O
Css

OL- C
vOL

1

0

?0

(7)

(8)

fiv

withrespectto changesin v is negareactionfunction
The slopeofthehomesteader's
withrespectto s is positive.The numerativewhiletheslopeoftherancher'sfunction
is negativedue to
function
is positivewhilethedenominator
torofthehomesteader's
thesecondorderconditionformaximization.
Usingthesame logic,theslope of the
to any
is positive.In otherwords,homesteader's
rancher'sfunction
respondnegatively
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increasein efforts
whileranchers
to increasesin effort
by ranchers
respondpositively
homesteaders
for
set
of
variables.
by
anygiven
exogenous
To analyzetheimpactof each exogenousvariableon theoptimallevel of s and v,
we differentiated
thereactionfunctions
withrespectto each exogenousvariable.What
differentiates
ourapplication
fromthatofAlstonet al. is themodelingoftheprobabilof therelativepopulationn. Equation9 represents
the
ityof an evictionas a function
derivative
oftherancher's
reactionfunction,
andequation10 thatofthehomesteader's
withrespectto n.
dV _
I

dN

vnOsL(,vvL

Cvv,)- fvOsL(fvvnoL)

(8vviL

dS -_finsL[(1

dN

-

>

Cvv,)2

(9)
O

- /P)OssL- Css ] f?vOsL(-nssL)10)
[(1- fi)ssL - Cs )12

One can demonstrate
thatthesignofequation9 is positivewhilethatofequation10 is
to the
negative.Increasesin therelativepopulationshiftsrancher'sreactionfunction
butsimultaneously
shifts
thehomesteader's
function
totheleft.
right,
Withoutadditionalstructure
imposedupon the model,the impacton the optimal
level of v is indeterminant.
To demonstrate
thisambiguity,
referto Figure1. Initially,
themodelis in equilibrium
withrancher'ssupplyvoand homesteader's
so
supplying
of ranchers
givena fixedlevel of n. Supposethatn increases.The reactionfunction
shiftsto theright,
Ranchersrespondby supplying
holdings constant.
vl. Homesteaders respondto theincreasein v by movingdowntheirreactionfunction
and supply
less s. However,an increasein n shiftshomesteaders
reactionfunction
to theleft.The
resultis an unambiguous
declinein theoptimalsupplyofs, butan ambiguouschange
in theoptimalsupplyof v. If one assumes,whichwe do, thattheshiftof thehomesteader'sreactionfunction
dominates
thatoftherancher's,
thentheresultwillbe a declineinboths andv.
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